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Article

Terms of Use
Mark A. Lemley†
Electronic contracting has experienced a sea change in the
last decade. Ten years ago, courts required affirmative evidence
of agreement to form a contract. No court had enforced a
“shrinkwrap” license,1 much less treated a unilateral statement
of preferences as a binding agreement. Today, by contrast,
more and more courts and commentators seem willing to accept
the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees to
it. Every court to consider the issue has found “clickwrap” licenses, in which an online user clicks “I agree” to standard
form terms, enforceable.2 A majority of courts in the last ten
† William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP. Thanks to Julie Cohen, Clay Gillette, Bob
Gomulkiewicz, Rose Hagan, Bob Hillman, Dennis Karjala, Mike Madison,
James Maxeiner, Joe Miller, Michael Risch, Pam Samuelson, and participants
in the Harvard-Berkeley “Cyber-camp” for comments on the project. I represented Cairo in the Cairo v. Crossmedia Services case discussed in this Article.
My views of that case (and all others) are my own, not my firm’s or my clients’.
© 2006 by Mark A. Lemley.
1. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1248−53 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property]
(cataloguing cases).
2. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638−39 (8th Cir.
2005); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d
756, 781−83 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Salco Distribs., L.L.C. v. iCode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV642-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 449156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006); Mortgage Plus,
Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2592, 2004 WL 2331918, at *4−5 (D. Kan. Aug. 23,
2004); i-Sys., Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL
742082, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004); Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 451−52 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (enforcing a forum selection clause not initially visible in a clickwrap agreement); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level
Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330−31 (D. Mass. 2002); Caspi v. Microsoft Network,
L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532−33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); cf. Hotmail Corp.
v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98-20064JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *3−9 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 16, 1998) (assuming such an agreement was enforceable without discussing
the issue).
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years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses, on the theory that
people agree to the terms by using the software they have already purchased.3 Finally, and more recently, an increasing
number of courts have enforced “browsewrap” licenses, in
which the user does not see the contract at all but in which the
license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a contract whether the user knows it or not.4 Collectively, I call shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap licenses
“terms of use,” because they control (or purport to control) the
circumstances under which buyers of software or visitors to a
public Web site can make use of that software or site.
The rise of terms of use has drawn a great deal of attention
because of the mass-market nature of the resulting agreements. Companies draft terms of use with mass market transactions—and therefore with consumers or other small end us3. ProCD was the first decision to enforce a shrinkwrap license. See
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448−49 (7th Cir. 1996). A number of
courts before that time had refused to enforce them. See Step-Saver Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102−03 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268−70 (5th Cir. 1988); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v.
Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763−66 (D. Ariz. 1993); cf. Foresight
Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1009−10 (D. Kan. 1989) (dictum).
Since ProCD, a majority of courts have enforced shrinkwrap licenses. See
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638−39 (8th Cir. 2005); Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323−25 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106−07 (E.D. Cal.
2006); Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-1859,
2000 WL 1468535, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000); Peerless Wall & Window
Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000);
Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090−91 (N.D.
Cal. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305,
311−13 (Wash. 2000); cf. Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 986−88 (9th Cir. 2005) (enforcing a notice of terms
printed on the outside of a box and read before purchase, but distinguishing
cases in which the terms weren’t available until after purchase).
Nonetheless, a significant number of courts continue to refuse to enforce
shrinkwrap licenses. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1340−41 (D. Kan. 2000); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp.
2d 1218, 1230−31 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah
1999); cf. Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., No. C96-3998TEH,
1997 WL 258886, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan 22, 1997) (refusing to allow a shrinkwrap license to modify a prior signed contract).
4. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428−30 (2d Cir. 2004);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *1−2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000); cf. Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No.
C04-04825JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (enforcing a forum selection clause in a browsewrap while purporting not to rule on the enforceability of the browsewrap itself ).
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ers—in mind. Commentators—including myself—have focused
on the impact of this new form of contract on consumers.5 But
5. Innumerable sources discuss this topic. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala,
Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 511, 525−34 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 136−44 (1999)
[hereinafter Lemley, Beyond Preemption]; Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra
note 1, at 1274−92; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of
Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1612−13 (1995)
(suggesting that shrinkwrap license terms should be preempted when there is
sufficient uniformity in the industry that the terms in effect amount to “private legislation” by software vendors); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 53, 56−77 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45
DUKE L.J. 479, 517−41 (1995); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract,
and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions
Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 602−05 (1992); Ramona
L. Paetzold, Comment, Contracts Enlarging a Copyright Owner’s Rights: A
Framework for Determining Unenforceability, 68 NEB. L. REV. 816, 819−22
(1989); Nathaniel Good et al., Stopping Spyware at the Gate: A User Study of
Privacy, Notice and Spyware 1−10 (July 2005) (working paper, on file with the
University of Minnesota Law Review) (explaining that users don’t read EndUser License Agreements (EULAs) before downloading programs, but regret it
when told what terms those EULAs include); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are
“Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software
License Agreements (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 05-10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799282;
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements (N.Y.U. Sch.
of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799274.
For criticism of ProCD on contract law grounds, see, for example, Michael
J. Madison, Legal Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 200 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1049−54 (1998); Jason Kuchmay, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Section 301 Copyright Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses—A Real
Bargain for Consumers?, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 137−46 (1997); Kell Corrigan
Mercer, Note, Consumer Shrink-Wrap Licenses and Public Domain Materials;
Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code Validity in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287, 1296−97 (1997); Apik Minassian,
Note, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 583−86 (1997); Robert J. Morrill, Comment, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case Comment on ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 513, 537−50 (1998); Christopher L.
Pitet, Comment, The Problem With “Money Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 325, 345−47 (1997); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future of
Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1647−48 (1997).
For criticism of ProCD on copyright preemption grounds, see Niva ElkinKoren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 106−13 (1997); Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or
“Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 173−75
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in the long run, terms of use may have their most significant
impact not on consumers, but on businesses. The law has paid
some attention to the impact of terms of use on consumers: virtually all of the courts that have refused to enforce a browsewrap license have done so to protect consumers.6 Conversely,
virtually all the courts that have enforced browsewrap licenses
have done so against a commercial entity, generally one that
competes with the drafter of the license.7 Further, those courts
(1999); Brian Covotta & Pamela Sergeeff, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 35, 41−49 (1998); Thomas Finkelstein & Douglas C.
Wyatt, Note, Shrinkwrap Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 839, 868−69 (1997); Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of Copyright Protection for Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are
Shrinkwrap Licenses a Viable Alternative for Database Protection?, 31 IND. L.
REV. 143, 165−72 (1998); Mercer, supra, at 1331−44; Minassian, supra, at
592−601; Tarolli, supra, at 1652−56; Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg: The End Does Not Justify the Means in Federal Copyright Analysis, 1998 BYU L. REV. 303, 318−28 (1998); Note, Contract Law—Shrinkwrap
Licenses—Seventh Circuit Holds That Shrinkwrap Licenses Are Enforceable—
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1946, 1950−51 (1997).
For arguments endorsing the result in ProCD, see Darren C. Baker, Note,
ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation,
and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 NW.
U. L. REV. 379, 400−06 (1997); Brandon L. Grusd, Note, Contracting Beyond
Copyright: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 361−66
(1997); Michael A. Jaccard, Note, Securing Copyright in Transnational Cyberspace: The Case for Contracting with Potential Infringers, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 619, 645−48 (1997); Jerry David Monroe, Comment, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg: An Emerging Trend in Shrinkwrap Licensing?, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 143, 159−64 (1997); Joseph C. Wang, Casenote, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally, the Validation of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 16
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 439, 442 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546,
556−57 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that an employer could not make a policy a provision of an employment agreement merely by posting it on the employee
intranet); Waters v. Earthlink, Inc., 91 F.App’x 697, 698 (1st Cir. 2003) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause posted on a Web site in the absence of
proof the consumer had seen the clause); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp.,
306 F.3d 17, 35−38 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce browsewrap against
consumers). One partial exception to this statement is Dyer v. Northwest Airlines, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199−1200 (D.N.D. 2004), which held that a privacy policy posted on a Web site was not enforceable as a contract against the
posting company. It is worth noting that in Dyer the plaintiffs brought a consumer class action suit and could not demonstrate even that their members
had accessed the site in question. Id.
7. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428−30 (2d Cir. 2004);
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C04-04825JW, 2005 WL 756610, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1−2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); cf.
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing
to rule that browsewraps were unenforceable on a motion to dismiss).
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that have enforced shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses against
consumers have protected consumers against certain clauses
considered unreasonable.8 However, courts presume that businesses know what they are doing when they access another
company’s Web site and are therefore more likely to bind them
to that site’s terms of use. Sophisticated economic entities are
unlikely to persuade a court that a term is unconscionable.9
And, because employees are agents whose acts bind the corporation, the proliferation of terms of use means that a large
company likely “agrees” to dozens or even hundreds of different
contracts every day, merely by its employees using the Internet. Since people rarely read the terms of use,10 those multiple
contracts likely contain a variety of different terms that may
create obligations inconsistent with each other and with the
company’s own terms of use.
We faced a situation like this before, decades ago. As business-to-business commerce became more common in the middle
of the twentieth century, companies began putting standard
contract terms on the back of their purchase orders and shipment invoices. When each party to a contract used such a form,

8. For example, courts have been unwilling to enforce onerous arbitration and choice of forum clauses against consumers, even when the consumer
agreed to a standard form imposing such requirements. See infra notes 61−62,
65−71 and accompanying text. And the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) forbids the use of electronic self-help in mass market transactions, even if the parties agree otherwise. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO.
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 816 (2001).
9. See Amy J. Schmitz, Unconscionability’s Fight for Fairness 26 (2005)
(working paper, on file with the University of Minnesota Law Review) (studying the use of unconscionability in courts and finding that most courts reject
such claims); cf. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: AVOIDANCE
AND REFORMATION § 29.4, at 392 (2002) (“Most claims of unconscionability
fail.”).
10. See, e.g., Straus v. Victor Talking Machs. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917)
(“[N]ot one purchaser in many would read such a notice, and . . . not one in a
much greater number, if he did read it, could understand its involved and intricate phraseology, which bears many evidences of being framed to conceal
rather than to make clear its real meaning and purpose.”); Lydia Pallas Loren,
Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 512−22 (2004).
Indeed, the fact that these forms are never read is so notorious that one company, PC Pitstop, actually promised in its terms of use to pay money to anyone
who read them and wrote in, and it was months before anyone noticed the
term and collected a check. See Larry Magrid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited
Nov. 6, 2006). Who knows if the story is apocryphal, but the fact that it seems
plausible makes my point.
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courts had to confront the question of whose terms controlled.
After unsuccessful judicial experimentation with a variety of
rules,11 the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) resolved this
“battle of the forms” by adopting a compromise: if the terms
conflict, neither party’s terms become part of the contract
unless a party demonstrates its willingness to forego the deal
over it.12 Rather, the default rules of contract law apply where
the parties’ standard forms disagree, but where neither party
insists on those terms.
I have three goals in this Article. First, I explain how
courts came to enforce browsewrap licenses, at least in some
cases. Second, I suggest that if courts enforce browsewraps at
all, enforcement should be limited to the context in which it has
so far occurred—against sophisticated commercial entities who
are repeat players. Finally, I argue that even in that context,
the enforcement of browsewraps creates problems that need to
be resolved. Business-to-business (b2b) terms of use are the
modern equivalent of the battle of the forms. We need a parallel solution to this “battle of the terms.” In Part I, I describe the
development of the law to the point where assent is no longer
even a nominal element of a contract. In Part II, I explain how
recent decisions concerning browsewrap licenses likely bind
businesses but not consumers, and the problems that that disparity will create for commercial litigation. Finally, in Part III I
discuss possible ways to solve this emerging problem and some
broader implications the problem may have for browsewrap licenses generally.
I. THE DEATH OF ASSENT
Assent by both parties to the terms of a contract has long
been the fundamental principle animating contract law.13 In11. For the history of the battle of the forms and the “mirror image” and
“last shot” rules that preceded it, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 3.21 (1990). For an academic discussion of the battle of the forms, see, for
example, Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1253−55
(1982); Victor P. Goldberg, The “Battle of the Forms”: Fairness, Efficiency, and
the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155, 158−65 (1997); John E. Murray, Jr.,
The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1, 11
(2000).
12. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2003).
13. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff ’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Promises become binding
when there is a meeting of the minds and consideration is exchanged. So it
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deed, it is the concept of assent that gives contracts legitimacy
and distinguishes them from private legislation. But in today’s
electronic environment, the requirement of assent has withered
away to the point where a majority of courts now reject any requirement that a party take any action at all demonstrating
agreement to or even awareness of terms in order to be bound
by those terms.14 The result, as Peggy Radin has put it, is “to
move the word consent far from what it used to mean, and far
from what it has meant in the political, legal, and social understanding of the institution of contract.”15
A. STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
The disintegration of assent results from the confluence of
three different elements in the online environment. The first is
the ease with which electronic contracting permits the imposition of standard form contracts on a large, anonymous mass of
users. Anyone can now “contract” with those she encounters
online by merely drafting a legal form and seeking whatever
assent to that form the courts require.16 Standard form contracts have been with us for decades,17 and they can serve useful purposes in reducing transaction costs in mass-market, repeat-play settings.18 In the online environment, these standardwas at King’s Bench in common law England; so it was under the common law
in the American colonies; so it was through more than two centuries of jurisprudence in this country; and so it is today.”). The U.C.C. defines a contract as
the “legal obligation which results from the parties’ agreement.” U.C.C. § 1201(11) (2003); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 3.1.
14. Others have observed this as well. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006); Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2006); cf. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2006) (analogizing such agreements to chattel servitudes disfavored in real property law).
15. Margaret Jane Radin, Machine Rule: The Latest Challenge to Law 28
(Jan. 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Minnesota Law Review).
16. Indeed, even lawyers’ fees are no longer an obstacle: you can buy your
very own terms of use for a Web site (“[f ]or use in all states”) for just $8.99
from FindLegalForms.com. See FindLegalForms.com, Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.findlegalforms.com/xcart/customer/product.php?productid=
28151 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
17. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1983).
18. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW 73 (1979); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (2006); Baird & Weisberg, supra note 11, at
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form agreements take the form of clickwrap licenses—
agreements that visitors to a Web site sign electronically by
clicking “I agree” to a standard set of terms. Clickwraps put
some pressure on the classical notion of assent derived from
bargained agreements, because they substitute a blanket, takeit-or-leave-it assent for the classical notion that the parties actually thought about and agreed to the terms of the deal.
Offline, such agreements are not all that common, in part
because it is too much effort to get consumers to sign the standard forms. While they do exist in many contexts—renting cars
is an oft-used example—most consumer transactions do not involve any written contract with the vendor at all. Merchants
and consumers at grocery stores, restaurants, bookstores, clothing stores, and countless other retail outlets seem perfectly able
to enter into contracts without a written agreement specifying
their rights and obligations. Nonetheless, many of those same
retail outlets impose standard form contracts on their online
users, probably because it is easier to get someone to click “I
agree” as part of an online transaction than it is to have a clerk
obtain a signature on a written form.
Because the user has “signed” the contract by clicking “I
agree,”19 every court to consider the issue has held clickwrap
licenses enforceable.20 There is nothing inherently troubling
about enforcing clickwrap licenses. Blanket assent to a form
contract is still assent, albeit a more attenuated form than the
assent that drives contract theory. But the prevalence of such
standard form contracts online has arguably conditioned both
consumers and courts to expect the retailer to set the terms of

1253−55; Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 977 (2005).
19. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN) confirm the general rule that a party can manifest assent in a variety of ways by making it
clear that electronic signatures are valid. Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 225 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir.
2005); Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(enforcing a forum selection clause not initially visible in a clickwrap agreement);
i-Sys., Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 742082, at
*7 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183
F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732
A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); cf. Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money
Pie, Inc., No. C-98-20064JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *1−9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)
(assuming such an agreement was enforceable without discussing the issue).
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the deal in writing, even when there is no similar expectation
for parallel transactions offline.
B. SHRINKWRAP LICENSES
The growing judicial acceptance of shrinkwrap licenses has
further undermined classical notions of assent. These licenses,
common in the pre-packaged sale of physical copies of software
in the 1980s and 1990s, included a license packaged within the
shrinkwrap or loaded on the computer and provided that breaking the shrinkwrap or running the program constituted acceptance of the terms of the contract.21 At least in the classic
shrinkwrap license, the user never clicks or signs an agreement
to any such terms.22 Rather, the theory of the shrinkwrap license is that the user manifests assent to those terms by engaging in a particular course of conduct that the license specifies
constitutes acceptance.
So-called “unilateral” contracts accepted by performance,
while rare in the offline world, are not unheard of.23 Two things
make shrinkwrap licenses different, and more troubling, than
traditional unilateral contracts. First, the user does not receive
the contract terms until after she has shelled out money for the
product. While some software products have a notice that terms
are included inside, others do not, and in any event we do not
generally think of necessary terms to an agreement being
available only after the consumer has made the decision to purchase. In theory, shrinkwrap licenses solve this problem by
permitting the buyer to return the software for a full refund,
though that option is sufficiently inconvenient as to be impractical24 and in any event turns out in practice to be illusory:
software vendors and retail stores generally refuse to accept

21. For background and history of shrinkwrap licenses, see Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1239.
22. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed infra,
was different, because Zeidenberg actually had to click “I accept” when faced
with the terms, albeit only after he had loaded the software on his computer.
Id. at 1450.
23. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L.
REV. 551, 551 (1983).
24. A partial exception is the UCITA, in force only in Virginia and Maryland, which provides that to be enforceable a shrinkwrap license must compensate the user for the costs of return. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 208 cmt. 6 (2001).
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software returned under those conditions.25 Second, the specified conduct that indicates acceptance is the opening of a package and the loading of software the consumer has already paid
for—precisely the conduct one would expect the user to engage
in if she had been unaware of the shrinkwrap license. Unlike a
typical unilateral contract, in which one party accepts an offer
by engaging in conduct that unmistakably indicates assent—
say, painting my house—the conduct used as evidence of a
shrinkwrap contract is hardly unambiguous evidence of assent.
Until 1996, every court to consider the validity of a
shrinkwrap license held it unenforceable.26 The tide began to
turn with Judge Easterbrook’s 1996 opinion upholding a
shrinkwrap license in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.27 ProCD held
Zeidenberg bound to terms he first saw when he loaded
ProCD’s software into his computer, even though he paid for
the software before being made aware of the terms.28 The
court’s legal reasoning is certainly questionable. Judge Easterbrook relied on U.C.C. section 2-204, which provides that a contract can be formed in any way the parties agree.29 But arguably he should have treated the additional terms as a proposed
modification to the contract Zeidenberg entered into when he
handed money to a store clerk in exchange for a box containing
software. Under U.C.C. section 2-209, such proposed new terms
can become part of the contract without additional consideration, but not if they make material changes to the contract, as
ProCD’s terms likely did.30 ProCD also distinguished U.C.C.
section 2-207, which deals with the situation of standard forms
exchanged by the parties.31 The court reasoned that section 2207 could not apply unless the parties exchanged at least two
25. Any number of people have tried to return software and been refused.
For one story that ultimately resulted in a lawsuit and a settlement requiring
return, see Ed Foster, A Fatal Blow to Shrinkwrap Licensing?, INFOWORLD,
Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.gripe2ed.com/scoop/story/2004/12/20/8257/4850.
26. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir.
1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988);
Ariz. Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993);
cf. Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989)
(dictum) (denying an injunction against a party that made adaptations to
software in violation of the terms of the licensing agreement that accompanied
the program and questioning the enforceability of such agreements generally).
27. 86 F.3d at 1447−48.
28. Id. at 1450−55.
29. Id. at 1452.
30. U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003).
31. 86 F.3d at 1452.

LEMLEY_4FMT

2006]

12/22/2006 11:04:48 AM

TERMS OF USE

469

forms, an interpretation that finds some support in the language of the section but that leads to the peculiar result that
merchant buyers get more protection against a seller’s standard form than consumers do.32 Despite these and other problems,33 the ProCD opinion has proved influential. While a
number of courts since 1996 have continued to reject shrinkwrap licenses,34 still more courts have followed ProCD and enforced those licenses.35
Both the clickwrap and shrinkwrap cases may have conditioned courts to abandon the idea of assent when it comes to
browsewraps. Legally, there is a big difference between a unilateral statement of desires and a statement of terms to which
the other party has agreed. But once we have expanded agreement to include clicking on a Web site or engaging in conduct
that we would expect the buyer to engage in anyway, it seems
only a small step to enforce a unilateral statement of terms. As
the argument goes, if we refuse to enforce browsewraps, a site
owner will simply impose the same restrictions via clickwrap or
shrinkwrap. Since no one reads the latter forms of contract
anyway, and owners can include whatever terms they want,36 it
32. Id. For contrary reasoning regarding section 2-207 and shrinkwrap
licenses, see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir.
1991).
33. ProCD can also fairly be criticized for refusing even to discuss the issue of Supremacy Clause preemption, an issue briefed by the parties and necessary for the court to resolve in order to reach the result it did, and for playing fast and loose with the facts by assuming that ProCD was in fact engaged
in price discrimination despite the absence of any evidence in the case that it
was willing to sell to competitors at any price.
34. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan.
2000); Novell v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Utah
1997), vacated in part, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127 P.3d 560, 562 (Okla. 2005), republished in 138 P.3d 826, 827
(Okla. 2005); cf. Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., No. C963998TEH, 1997 WL 258886, at *2−4 (N.D. Cal. Jan 22, 1997) (refusing to allow a shrinkwrap license to modify a prior signed contract).
35. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir.
2005); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe
Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1859, 2000 WL
1468535, at *1−2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Pa. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307 (Wash. 2000).
36. Examples of the more remarkable terms included in such agreements
include: terms that prevent you from deleting a program once you load it on
your computer, e.g., Kontiki Software DRM license (on file with author); terms
that forbid disparaging the seller, e.g., Microsoft Frontpage 2002 license (on
file with author); terms that forbid benchmarking or reviewing the product,
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seems a sort of formalism to require them to go through the effort of requiring some weak manifestation of assent.
C. WEB SITES AS PROPERTY
The final nail in the online assent coffin is the overlap between contract claims and concepts of property. The fact that
almost all of the Internet cases to enforce a browsewrap come
up in the property/trespass context37 inclines courts to take real
property rules and apply them to contract law. I don’t need
agreement to my “no-trespassing” sign in the physical world: I
only need to give notice of my desire to enforce the property
rights the law has already given me. So perhaps it’s not surprising that the courts in this context make the seemingly
small jump to concluding the same is true of contract law. If I
told you what I wanted you to do (or not to do) with my Web
site, and you did something different, you must have breached
the agreement that allowed you to come onto the site.
The problem is that the shift from property law to contract
law takes the job of defining the Web site owner’s rights out of
e.g., Network Associates VirusScan license (on file with author); and my personal favorite, which speaks for itself:
Should you fail to register any of the evaluation software available
through our web pages and continue to use it, be advised that a
leather-winged demon of the night will tear itself, shrieking blood and
fury, from the endless caverns of the nether world, hurl itself into the
darkness with a thirst for blood on its slavering fangs and search the
very threads of time for the throbbing of your heartbeat. Just thought
you’d want to know that. Alchemy Mindworks accepts no responsibility for any loss, damage or expense caused by leather-winged demons
of the night, either.
Alchemy Mindworks, http://www.mindworkshop.com/alchemy/alchemy6.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006); cf. I Luv Video Register Agreement, http://web
.archive.org/web/20050311083818/http://www.salguod.com/blog/archives/2004/
12/people_will_sig.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (“I hereby surrender my
soul for all eternity to the clerks at I Luv Video and will become part of their
legion of zombies.”).
37. Indeed, all four cases to enforce a browsewrap involved allegations of a
competitor linking to or scraping data from the Web site, and included allegations of trespass to chattels and other torts as well. See Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs.,
Inc., No. C04-04825JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 975 (E.D. Cal. 2000). This fact may also explain the otherwise
surprising application of criminal statutes against computer hacking to enforce terms of use attached to Web sites. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2003).
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the hands of the law and into the hands of the site owner.
Property law may or may not prohibit a particular “intrusion”
on a Web site,38 but it is the law that determines the answer to
that question. The reason my “no-trespassing” sign is effective
in the real world is not because there is any sort of agreement
to abide by it, but because the law already protects my land
against intrusion by another. If the sign read “no walking on
the road outside my property,” no one would think of it as an
enforceable agreement. If we make the conceptual leap to assuming that refusing to act in the way the site owner wants is

38. There is a vibrant debate among courts on this point. Compare Oyster
Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724-JCS, 2001 WL
1736382, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001), Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care
Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892 (N.D. Iowa 2001), Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065−66 (N.D. Cal. 2000), and CompuServe
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (all
finding access to a Web site or computer server to be a trespass), with Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL
525390, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (refusing to apply the doctrine of trespass to chattels to the Internet in the absence of proven harm), Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003) (refusing to apply trespass to chattels to
an individual’s email sent to Intel employees), and Express One Int’l, Inc. v.
Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding no cause of action for
conversion of information posted online because the information was not property).
Commentators have also taken disparate positions on this point. See Dan
L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27
(1999); Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge,
Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace-Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445
(2001); Bridget A. Clarke, When Not to Pour Spam into an Old Bottle: Intel v.
Hamidi, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2001, at 20; Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers
Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Seth F.
Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 145−47 (2001);
Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003); David
McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 109 (2005); David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341 (2003); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition on
the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1965, 1966−67 (2000); Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels
on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2002); I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, J. ONLINE L., Oct. 1996, para. 7, http://www.wm
.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/hardy.html; cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of
Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357−64 (2003) (arguing that
many debates, including this one, depend on whether the decision-maker
takes a perspective internal to the Internet or an external perspective).
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also a breach of contract, it becomes the site owner rather than
the law that determines what actions are forbidden.39 The law
then enforces that private decision. One might like or dislike
the vesting of such control in a site owner as a matter of policy,
but doing so is an abandonment of the notion of assent. It is
easier to abandon that notion if we conflate property and contract (call it “protract”40) in this way.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF BROWSEWRAP LICENSES
A. BUSINESS VS. CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
The standard-form contract is designed for circumstances
in which one party is in control of the transaction, is a repeat
player, and has an interest in setting the terms. Typically,
these are consumer or small business mass-market transactions. But while the law has started to enforce browsewraps, it
has also evolved to provide significant protection to consumers
who are allegedly bound by those “agreements.” An examination of the cases that have considered browsewraps in the last
five years demonstrates that the courts have been willing to enforce terms of use against corporations, but have not been willing to do so against individuals.
The four main cases in which courts have enforced
browsewraps have the same basic fact pattern. The plaintiff
runs a Web site. The defendant is a smaller company, often a
competitor, who repeatedly accesses the plaintiff’s Web site to
collect data, often using software “robots.” The plaintiff objects
to this access, nominally because of load on its servers, but in
fact because the plaintiff wants to make sure the defendant
cannot access its data. The defendant may or may not be aware
of the terms of use, but it is generally aware that the plaintiff
objects to the defendant’s use of the site. Indeed, the plaintiffs
often use technical means to block the defendant from accessing the site, and defendants try to evade those means. Courts
generally conclude that because of this repeated interaction,
the defendant was at least aware of the terms of use even
though it never assented to those terms. And because the cases
39. Cf. Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet,
44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 434−35 (2003) (explaining that courts sometimes approach Internet access controls through the lens of property, and sometimes
through contract).
40. Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1257, 1259 n.7 (1998).
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all include property as well as contract claims, it is all too easy
for courts to conflate the two, concluding that the niceties of assent don’t really matter because the Web site owner was merely
enforcing rules they had the legal power to impose on users of
their property.41
In Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, for example, the plaintiff
sold tickets to concerts and similar events online and had exclusive rights to sell tickets for a number of events.42 Tickets.com competed with Ticketmaster. When it could not sell
tickets to a particular event because of Ticketmaster’s exclusivity, it linked to the place customers could buy that ticket on
Ticketmaster’s site. To create such a link, Tickets.com regularly
searched the Ticketmaster site using a robot. Ticketmaster objected to Tickets.com’s use, even though it got sales from this
link, likely because it thought it could disadvantage its competitor by making it unable to link directly to the Ticketmaster
site. Ticketmaster sued on a variety of theories. While the district court rejected its copyright and trespass claims,43 and initially rejected its contract claims as well,44 it ultimately held
that Ticketmaster might be able to enforce its terms of use
against Tickets.com because Tickets.com was aware that Ticketmaster objected to its competitor accessing and linking to the
Ticketmaster site.45
Most of the other cases that have enforced browsewrap licenses involve somewhat similar facts. In Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc., rather than linking to Crossmedia’s site,
Cairo scraped Crossmedia’s uncopyrighted information to make
it available to customers.46 In Pollstar v. Gigmania, the defen41. Ironically, however, at least some of the courts that have made this
easy equation have in fact allowed Web site owners to stop conduct that the
doctrines of nuisance or trespass to chattels would not have prevented. See
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (permitting a contract claim to go forward based on a browsewrap); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No.
CV997654HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000)
(refusing to apply the doctrine of trespass to chattels in the same context).
42. 2000 WL 525390, at *1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1. The court denied summary
judgment on Ticketmaster’s contract claim, but appeared to leave open the legal question whether sending a “spider into the TM interior web pages . . . can
lead to a binding contract.” Id.
46. No. C04-04825JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *3−6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
Data “scraping” involves the automated collection of a class of data from a
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dant accessed the plaintiff-competitor’s Web site to scrape information.47 In Register.com v. Verio, the plaintiff maintained a
WHOIS directory—a collection of contact information required
by Internet rule to be open to the public—and objected to the
defendant’s effort to collect that information via robot and use
it in its marketing efforts.48 The defendants in all these cases
repeatedly accessed the plaintiff s’ Web sites, and were made
aware of the terms of use by the lawsuit, if not before, although
the claims for past conduct in many cases involved access engaged in by a robot that couldn’t read or understand those
terms of use. Each of these cases also included claims for trespass to chattels.
A second group of cases in which courts enforced a
browsewrap against a business did so not against a competing
business, but against the drafter of the browsewrap itself.49 In
that circumstance, it is fair to say that the party relying on the
contract for its cause of action has conceded its enforceability.50
In the few cases that have enforced a browsewrap term
against a consumer, the issue was not the creation of a contract, but whether a company could modify an established contract with a customer by adding an arbitration clause.51 The
company in both such cases notified the customer of the change
and linked to the new clause online without requiring assent to
the change.52 Although the court in Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum,
for example, held that the term in question was not uncon-

Web site. See, e.g., George H. Fibbe, Screen-Scraping and Harmful Cybertrespass After Intel, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1011, 1012−13 (2004).
47. 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
48. 356 F.3d 393, 395−97 (2d Cir. 2004).
49. See, e.g., Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149,
150−54 (Cal. App. 2d 2003). In that case, the court found a forum selection
clause enforceable even though it required clicking on a link to read it. Id. at
151, 153. However, the case didn’t involve the contract drafter seeking to enforce the contract, but rather a third party seeking to rely on the contract. Id.
at 152.
50. But see Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20−21 (2d
Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce a browsewrap term); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines
Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (holding the defendant’s
online privacy policy insufficient to sustain a breach of contract action).
51. See Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005).
52. Id. at 179; see also Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 117−19 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 844 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. 2006) (enforcing an arbitration clause included in an online “Terms and Conditions of Sale” hyperlink).
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scionable, it did not expressly consider the enforceability of the
agreement itself.53
Contrast the general circumstances in which courts have
enforced browsewrap terms of use with the cases in which
courts have refused to enforce them. In Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., Netscape sought to enforce terms of use
against individuals who downloaded free software from the
Netscape site.54 Netscape pointed to the fact that it had terms
of use on its site and that those terms provided that anyone
who visited the site necessarily agreed to those terms.55 The individuals claimed that they had not seen any link to the terms
of use and had not read those terms. The court held that because Netscape did not show the terms of use to the individuals
downloading the software, much less require them to agree, the
terms did not constitute an enforceable agreement.56 And in
Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp., the
53. Briceño, 911 So. 2d at 181. Ironically, the same Florida appellate court
later held in a case involving business entities that additional terms supposedly added to a written contract in much the same way were not part of the
agreement. Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consol. Credit Counseling Servs., Inc.,
920 So. 2d 1286, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
54. 306 F.3d at 20.
55. Id. at 32−33. This sort of Catch-22 provision—by coming to the site,
you agree to terms that you can’t possibly read without coming to the site—is
surprisingly common in browsewraps. See, e.g., Ed Foster’s Gripelog, EULA
Nasties, http://www.gripe2ed.com/scoop/story/2004/5/13/0529/97735 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (“[The Wal-Mart Credit Card user agreement states that b]y
using the Site . . . you agree to abide by the . . . policies described in the Site. If
you do not agree to abide by these terms and conditions or any future terms
and conditions, please do not use the Site . . . .”); IBM Terms of Use—United
States, http://www.ibm.com/legal/us/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (“By accessing,
browsing, and/or using this web site, you acknowledge that you have read, understood, and agree, to be bound by these terms . . . . If you do not agree to
these terms, do not use this web site.”); Quikbook-Legal Information Notices,
http://www.quikbook.com/legal.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (“Please read
the following information carefully before accessing our Web site (“Site”) . . . .
By using the Site in any manner (for example, entering the Site, browsing . . .)
you are indicating your agreement to be bound by the following terms and
conditions of service (“Terms and Conditions”) . . . . If you do not agree with all
of the provisions of these Terms and Conditions, please do not enter or use the
Site.”); XE.com—Terms of Use, http://www.xe.com/legal/#terms (last visited
Nov. 6, 2006) (“Your use of this website or of any content presented . . . indicates your acknowledgement and agreement to these Terms of Use . . . .”).
Indeed, the problem is even worse than indicated above, because most
sites provide that their terms will change periodically and that the user is
automatically bound to those changed terms. They generally suggest that the
user “periodically visit” the terms of use to “determine the then current terms
to which you are bound.” IBM Terms of Use—United States, supra.
56. Specht, 306 F.3d at 35.
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First Circuit held that an employer could not bind an employee
to terms that the employer put on its Web site, because merely
posting information on an intranet and sending an e-mail to
that effect did not constitute adequate notice of a change that
would affect the employee’s legal rights.57 The court distinguished cases in which individuals had in fact manifested their
assent to changes in the terms of employment.58
What is notable about these cases, considered together, is
the division the courts seem to be creating between enforceability against businesses and enforceability against individuals.59
This may be merely an accident of the facts of the various cases
courts have faced. But there is reason to believe the businessconsumer distinction is more than coincidence. The law is regularly more solicitous of consumers than of commercial entities
in enforcing standard form contracts. A number of Internet
contract cases outside the browsewrap context impose limits on
class action restrictions,60 arbitration clauses,61 and choice of
law and forum provisions62—precisely the sorts of terms that,
57. 407 F.3d 546, 558 (1st Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 555. The court made it clear that its holding was limited to the
particular facts before it and not a general requirement for contracting outside
the employment context. Id. at 559.
59. Nonetheless, not all efforts to enforce browsewrap terms of use against
businesses are successful. See, e.g., Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consol. Credit
Counseling Servs., Inc., 920 So. 2d 1286, 1288−89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(refusing to enforce terms of use on a Web site that were alleged to be additional to an actual written contract between the parties).
For an interesting variation on the problem, see Snow v. DirecTV, Inc.,
450 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a claim that a company had
violated the Stored Communications Act by accessing an individual’s Web site
in violation of the terms of use, and rejecting the argument that requiring a
clicked agreement to those terms prevented the site from being “accessible to
the general public”).
60. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
61. Despite a federal policy favoring arbitration clauses, one recent study
documented that courts found arbitration clauses unconscionable at twice the
rate they found other provisions unconscionable. See Susan Randall, Judicial
Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004). For an example of an electronic arbitration
clause found unconscionable, see Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
62. See Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 231 (Cal. App. 2d
2005); Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 701−02 (Cal.
App. 2001); Scarcella v. Am. Online, Inc., 811 N.Y.S.2d 858, 858−59 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (per curiam); Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 106 P.3d 841, 843−45 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 126 P.3d 820 (Wash. 2005). But see Koch v.
Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695−96 (D. Md. 2000) (finding a forum
selection clause not sufficiently unfair or unreasonable to be unenforceable);

LEMLEY_4FMT

2006]

12/22/2006 11:04:48 AM

TERMS OF USE

477

like many browsewrap terms, extend beyond the rights the
intellectual property (IP) owner would have had without contract. Hopefully courts will similarly limit the ability of spyware providers to justify their behavior by pointing to terms of
use attached to their products.63
One plausible reading of the cases is that courts in
browsewrap cases show greater solicitude to consumers than to
businesses, and will enforce browsewraps primarily in business-to-business (b2b) rather than business-to-consumer (b2c)
transactions, and perhaps only in repeat transactions.64 Courts
may be willing to overlook the utter absence of assent only
when there are reasons to believe that the defendant is aware
of the plaintiff ’s terms. That awareness may be more likely
with corporations than individuals, perhaps because
corporations are repeat players, because they themselves employ terms of use and therefore should expect that others will,
or because some evidence in each individual case suggests they
are in fact more aware of those terms. Whether by accident or
by design, the result has so far been the same: browsewraps
end up having significance not in mass-market contract cases,
but in what are really b2b property cases.

Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (enforcing a forum selection clause in a clickwrap agreement); Groff
v. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC97-0311, 1998 WL 307001, at *2−6 (R.I. Super. Ct.
May 27, 1998) (holding that the plaintiff did not meet his burden of persuasion
regarding the unenforceability of a clickwrap forum selection clause).
63. “Spyware” is “software that is installed in a computer without the
user’s knowledge and transmits information about the user’s activities over
the Internet.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006).
For an argument that consumers shouldn’t always be allowed to “consent” to
the installation of spyware on their computers, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
Technoconsen(t)sus 1−4 (May 2006) (working paper, on file with the University of Minnesota Law Review).
64. An alternative formulation is that if a Web site visitor knew or should
have known of the existence of the terms of use, it will be bound by them even
if it didn’t read them, and corporations are generally assumed to be aware of
them while individuals are not. Cf. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d
393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Specht on the theory that the parties in
that case didn’t have notice of the terms). This alternative formulation fails to
explain the application of browsewraps against software robots, which aren’t
capable of reading or assenting to terms of use. Such cases could perhaps be
explained as sui generis, based on a plaintiff ’s use of the Robot Exclusion
Header, which is an electronic no-trespassing sign but not an agreement conditioning use on particular terms. Under this formulation, a Web site that
posts terms of use but does not employ the Robot Exclusion Header would not
be able to enforce those terms of use against a robot.
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B. THE PROBLEMS WITH B2B BROWSEWRAPS
Applying browsewraps to b2b transactions may prove unworkable, particularly if courts are willing to presume knowledge of terms merely from repeated visits to a site. Consider
the predicament of a large company employing a number of
white-collar workers. Those workers have computers at their
desks and spend part or all of the day online—searching the
Web; visiting competitor, supplier, or customer sites; buying
goods or services; and the like. Each of those employees acts as
an agent of the company, with apparent and likely actual authority to engage in those work-related acts.65 If browsewraps
are enforceable against corporations generally, a large company
can plausibly be said to enter into hundreds of different agreements every day.
The problem is worse than the sheer number of contracts
suggests. Many of those commitments are likely to overlap,
creating a mosaic of contractual commitments that may conflict. Sometimes contradicting commitments occur even within
a single transaction. An employee seeking to buy a desk chair
may search on Yahoo!, click on an ad from a company that
compares prices, and go from there to one or more retail stores
that can sell and ship chairs. Each of those pages has terms of
use that purport to govern the employee’s conduct. In Cairo,
Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc., Cairo’s offending robots
moved seamlessly across Crossmedia’s site, which hosted advertising circulars for dozens of big-box retailers and the sites
of each of those retailers.66 Each site had a browsewrap, and
each browsewrap had a choice-of-forum provision.67 Every time
Cairo sent a robot onto the Crossmedia site, that robot nominally agreed that any litigation about that visit would be litigated “only” in no fewer than eight different jurisdictions.68 The
district court enforced one of those choice-of-forum provisions,69
but in doing so it had to violate seven others.

65. I am leaving aside the tougher question of whether employees who
surf the Internet for personal reasons during work hours are agents whose
acts bind the corporation.
66. No. C04-04825JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
67. Id. at *2.
68. The terms of use agreements requiring exclusive jurisdiction in Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, San Jose, Seattle, and elsewhere are on file with the
author.
69. Cairo, 2005 WL 756610, at *6.
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In theory, one could think of these contradictory terms as a
relatively cabined problem. The problem shouldn’t arise all that
often if courts limit terms of use to governing only the conduct
that occurs while the employee is actually visiting the Web site
imposing the terms. The company will still have to confront the
myriad of terms that govern its behavior in the aggregate, but
for any given transaction it ought to be rare that more than one
set of terms apply.
In fact, however, many terms of use go much further, purporting to govern not just the use of a Web site but any transaction between the parties. In Cairo, the problem was not just
that the Cairo robot visited multiple sites: Crossmedia also visited the Cairo site, and Cairo’s own terms of use purported to
govern not just that visit but any transaction between the parties.70 There are numerous other examples of terms of use that
purport to govern any interaction between the parties, whether
or not the interaction arises out of the visit to the Web site.71
Further, one can easily imagine terms of use spiraling in this
direction. If my company can get an advantage over competitors or business partners by imposing my terms on them more
generally, it is surely only a matter of time before those adversaries figure that out and do the same to me.
Once terms of use govern any relationship between the
parties, the potential for overlapping and contradictory terms
grows exponentially. When Microsoft employees visit Yahoo!’s
site and Yahoo! employees visit Microsoft’s site, those visits
bind each company to the other’s terms. In these circumstances, it is practically impossible for the company to monitor,
much less control, the entering-into of such “contracts” without
preventing any employee from accessing a Web site not on an
approved list of sites, each of which has negotiated a deal with

70. See, e.g., Cairo Terms of Use Agreement (on file with author).
71. For example, Microsoft’s general terms of use provide that not just a
specific Web site interaction, but any “services that Microsoft provides to you,”
are subject to its terms. Microsoft—Information on Terms of Use, http://www
.microsoft.com/info/cpyright.mspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). The BuyDomains.com general terms of use set out policies governing “dispute[s] between
You and BuyDomains regarding the ownership of any Domain Name.” BuyDomains.com: Terms of Use, http://www.buydomains.com/info/terms-of-use.jsp
¶ 9 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). The license then goes further and requires
visitors not to bring any intellectual property claim of any type against it,
whether related to a BuyDomains domain name or not. Id. Finally, it requires
arbitration of “any dispute you may have with BuyDomains other than those
set out above.” Id.
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the company in advance.72 More likely, companies will do what
consumers do with mass market agreements today—they will
simply ignore the existence of those “contracts” until it is in the
interest of one side or the other to insist upon them in court.73
Courts will then have to find some way to choose between those
terms. And if electronic contracting based on Extensible
Markup Language takes off,74 companies may not even have
that option. Their robots will be asked to agree to terms, any
mismatch between the terms will become apparent, and robots
will either have to be programmed to ignore them or the terms
will kill the deal. In either case, we will have entered the battle
of the electronic forms. And surely the lesson of the last battle
of the forms was that it was ultimately a futile exercise, removing contract law from the realm of actual agreement and into
the realm of rampant formalism.75 U.C.C. section 2-207 was an
effort to replace that formalism with substance.
III. PREVENTING THE BATTLE OF THE
ELECTRONIC FORMS
The new battle of the electronic forms is a problem created
by a few courts that expanded contract law in a particular class
of browsewrap cases—those that are really allegations of trespass to Web sites. The ideal first-order solution is to recognize
that we have gone astray in these cases and that trying to analyze them under contract law doesn’t help create certainty or
promote any of the values contract law is supposed to serve.
Even the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), the abortive effort to create a model law of software
72. One possible private solution to this battle of terms is for companies to
include in their terms of use provisions that none of their employees are authorized to assent to other companies’ terms of use. But it is not clear that
such a term would be enforceable, particularly in a context in which the company regularly ratified transactions nominally subject to those very terms of
use it purported to reject.
73. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 3.21, at 261 (“In practice, most of
these transactions are carried out without incident, even though there is no
contract.”).
74. On electronic contracting of this sort, see, for example, Robert J.
Glushko et al., An XML Framework for Agent-based E-commerce, COMM. ACM,
Mar. 1999, at 106, 106−14. On its legal implications, see, for example, Clayton
P. Gillette, Interpretation and Standardization in Electronic Sales Contracts,
53 SMU L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2000) (exploring the issues raised by XML-based
electronic contracting in the areas of contract and sales law).
75. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58−59 (1963).
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contracting that was heavily criticized for being pro-plaintiff,76
required a manifestation of assent to create a contract.77 If I’m
right that those cases dispensing with the assent requirement
are really driven by the underlying property claim, courts
should analyze that property claim directly, rather than clouding it in a pseudo-contract theory.78 Saying that browsewraps
are enforceable only where the drafter already had a right to
prevent a particular use is the functional equivalent of refusing
to enforce those browsewraps. The concept of contract does no
useful work in either case. Indeed, it does affirmative harm by
preventing courts from addressing the disputed policy issues at
the heart of the property claim. At a bare minimum, courts
must resist the temptation to slide further down the slippery
slope, enforcing browsewraps in other contexts because they
have enforced them in this one.
Refusing to enforce browsewraps is a good idea. But even if
we get rid of browsewraps, the battle of the electronic forms
could well occur with clickwraps, and there traditional principles of contract law do seem to support enforcement. The problems may be lessened because many sites won’t actually require clicks, and people who click to agree are more aware that
they are engaging in conduct with legal significance. But the
battle of the electronic forms will still persist.
We solved the battle-of-the-forms problem in the Uniform
Commercial Code by enacting U.C.C. section 2-207. That section replaced the “last shot” rule, where the accident of which
form was sent last determined the conditions of the agreement,
with a functional rule that distinguished between merchants
and consumers.79 Between companies, the terms each side proposed became part of the contract unless they materially altered the deal, or unless one party insisted that it wouldn’t do
the deal without that term, and the other party didn’t similarly
insist on its own terms.80
76. See, e.g., Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 5, at 118−23;
McManis, supra note 5, at 173−75; David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis
of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 21−24 (1999).
77. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 208 (2001). Only Maryland and Virginia have adopted the UCITA.
78. But cf. Madison, supra note 39, at 433−38 (arguing that property and
contract claims should be treated in an integrated fashion).
79. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2003).
80. Id. There is disagreement among the courts and commentators as to
when terms become part of the transaction. Many courts have held that conflicting terms in standard forms simply drop out, with gaps filled by the
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U.C.C. section 2-207 by its terms may not apply to the electronic battle of the forms, because there are no “forms” being
exchanged as part of offer or acceptance in the context of a particular sale.81 But it is certainly possible to imagine updating
the U.C.C. provisions to account for this new problem. A reasonable rule might simply drop any conflicting terms out of a
multi-term situation. Agreed-upon terms would still apply; as
with section 2-207, terms that one side included and the other
didn’t could be included, but only if they don’t materially
change the deal. Application of such a new rule would presumably ratify what the courts have done so far in consumer
browsewrap cases: refused to add these terms to the contract,
at least where they involve significant changes. Or we could
(and I would) go further, and refuse to enforce any browsewrap
term replacing a default rule already written into contract
law.82
IV. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the problems terms of use pose stem
from a combination of factors: judicial willingness to weaken or
even eliminate the notion of assent when presented with a form
that purports to be a contract, and the ease with which technology allows companies (and perhaps even individuals) to present forms that purport to be contracts. I don’t want to suggest
that all contracts must look like the prototypical model of sophisticated parties bargaining over terms. But as we move furU.C.C. default rules. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569,
1579−80 (10th Cir. 1984); S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply,
Inc., 567 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Idaho 1977); St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI
Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83, 86−87 (N.D. 1985). But see FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, § 3.21, at 263−64; John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the “Battle
of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1354−65 (1986).
81. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the application of section 2-207 for this reason). Some question whether
the Seventh Circuit was correct to do so, however.
82. Other solutions are also possible. Omri Ben-Shahar and Victor Goldberg propose that in battle-of-the-forms cases courts should choose the “best”
or “most reasonable” of the terms. See Omri Ben-Shahar, An Ex-Ante View of
the Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms, 25 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 350, 357−63 (2005); Goldberg, supra note 11, at 166−71.
Robert Gomulkiewicz has proposed greater reliance on default rules in the
context of software warranties, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantability in Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares
to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
393, 400−02 (1997), though he would not go so far as to have such default
terms displace shrinkwrap licenses. Id. at 402.
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ther and further from that model, we introduce problems into
contract law analysis, because the principles of contract law fit
less and less well with the things we call contracts. At some
point it makes little sense to talk of parties agreeing at all, and
we need to fall back on substantive law—whether the law of
property or the default rules of the U.C.C.—to govern disputed
conduct. Wherever the line is between agreement and unilateral action, browsewraps are on the wrong side of the line.

